The Scarcity-Causes-Violence Paradigm Continued...

My last blog post was frustrating because, although I found Eyal Weizman’s aridity map fascinating, I found myself feeling as though I was at a dead end for answers about whether water scarcity really can be a cause of conflict (that has resultantly lead to Western drone strikes).

Not wanting to let the matter go… I am on a mission in this post to try and look more deeply at the discussion.

Googling the issue and you would almost certainly believe that yes, ‘water scarcity’ very much so is a cause of concern in relation to violent conflict. The Guardian has warned that climate change is going to bring global threats of both terrorism and war. Al Jazeera similarly warns that ‘almost half of humanity will face water scarcity by 2030’ and even offers an interactive map they made to show areas where water scarcity may have connected to conflict. In 2011, the World Economic Forum included water as one of the world’s top five risks for the first time in its Global Risk Report.

An example of Al Jazeera's water scarcity-conflict map. This Kenya example is  responded to later on in this post - see case study.

This mainstream thinking especially focuses on regions characterised by poverty. It assumes conflict in these areas is more likely to occur due to high levels of population growth and high dependency on natural resources, as well as the idea that poor countries are unable to allocate enough wealth to research and development in order to produce/substitute scare resources (Witsenburg and Wario Rosa, 2007). There are also arguments that:

‘Poor countries start at a disadvantage, many are underendowed with the social institutions that are necessary for an ample supply of both social and technical solutions to scarcity…’ (Dixon, 1999:108)

These arguments are known as Malthusian or neo-Malthusian, based on Malthus’ predictions of conflict or ‘tragedy of the commons’ due to either environmental supply issues (i.e. drought), or population growth.

However, there are arguments against these theories. To start, looking at the definitions of ‘water scarcity’ defined, it is Falkenmark’s (1989) criteria of  access to <1000 cubic metres per person annually, which, as highlighted in my first blog can be denounced as a highly unreliable. Therefore the claims to conflict on that back of this ‘scarcity’ can also be seen as unreliable.  Selby (2012) highlight how many studies have concluded that evidence of environmental conflict, and that, especially in relation to water, scarcities have actually tended to facilitate cooperation rather than contribute to conflict.  She also highlights how liberal political economists have argued that the reason there has been a historical absence of ‘water wars’ is that, with water being far from a finite resource, it is readily importable through water treatment and reuse or through the importation of virtual water’.

Case study: Is there a link between water scarcity and violent conflict in Kenya’s Drylands?

So far in my blog posts I haven’t really focused in too closely on any specific area or locality, though have been keen to do so soon. Sitting in the library I found myself opposite a book called ‘Conflicts over land and water in Africa’, which upon looking at the contents I found had a chapter written by Karen Witsenburg and Adano Wario Roba (2007) directly seeking to answer the question I am hoping to understand, with a specific focus on the Marsabit District in Kenya.  I think it gives an interesting response to the scarcity-causes-violence paradigm. 

Photo of the Marsibit Landscape

The chapter looks at the Marsabit District in Northern Kenya. The Marsabit region is characterized by volcanic mountains and surround semi-desert land. The average rainfall ranges from 800-1000 mm annually, though this can drop to around 200mm in the surrounding low lands (aridity). The region is inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups, most of them pastoralists, who have moved across the Ethiopian border for hundreds of years. Some of the ethinic groups include The Boran, Gabra, Somali, Dasenetch, Burji, and the Garri amongst many others.

“These groups have histories of animosity, friendship, temporal alliances and violent conflict”

Through interviews with users of the Bokoto well as well as secondary statistical data, they aimed to determine whether there were tensions over access rights to water resources and, if so, whether this was related to increasing population pressure. They also wanted to see how this this played out over both long and short term.

Looking at the course of the 1900’s they analysed rainfall data that showed that there has been an increasing amount of dry years towards the end of the century (with two years of <500mm before 1960 and seven years after). The late 1990’s also saw an escalation of ethnic violent conflicts in the region, leading to ninety-three deaths in 1998 and thirty-eight in 1999.  Is this connected to water scarcity though?

In 2000 severe drought was experienced in the region. Interviewing people at the Bokoto well the writers actually found that the user groups reported less conflict in times of drought ‘for sheer survival’. The different ethnic groups usually in conflict sought to reconcile their issues in times of drought in order to be able to access the less available water holes. Conflict is actually higher in wet years; they reported how higher grasses facilitate more raider attacks, and that animals are stronger and therefore able to walk further distances. Comparing this with colonial records they found a similar phenomenon recorded.

This is a very interesting insight which taken face value would go against Weizman’s theory that conflict follows water scarcity. However, this is only a small region, and one could argue relatively ‘small scale’ conflicts in relation to those that attract foreign intervention; it would be interesting to look at the likelihood of ‘water scarcity’ being a direct cause of conflict in those cases.

Overall however, I think from the analysis here I would agree with the UN that

‘While conflicts over water resources are common, there is effectively no known case where these have constituted the primary motivation for full- scale war. Rather, the very centrality of water makes cooperation a more likely response, evidenced in the much stronger record of cooperation. Violent conflicts are more likely to occur at the local level between competing user groups that are also divided along ethnic, religious or other lines.’

Homer-Dixon, T (1999) The Environment, Scarcity and Violence, New York: Princeton University Press.

Selby, J (2012) Water scarcity, conflict, and migration: a comparative analysis and reappraisal, Environment and Planning C, 30, 997-1014.

Witsenburg, K and Wario Roba, A (2007) The Use & Management of Water Sources in Kenya’s Drylands: is there a link between scarcity and violent conflicts? In Derman, B and Sjaastad, E (eds.) Conflicts Over Land and Water in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 215-239.

Conflict following lack of water? Eyal Weizman's tracking of the 'aridity line'

In this blog post I want to comment on something I heard about in a talk at the Southbank Centre last year. The talk was held by Naomi Klein, called ‘Let them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming World’. Celebrating Edward Said’s legacy, she transferred his profound theory of Othering and related it to the current climate crises in a variety of captivating ways. You can see a transcript or listen to a podcast of the talk here if you are interested yourselves.

One of the main things that particularly struck me from the talk, and that I will now make the subject of this blog post, is mention of the famous architect-come-academic Eyal Weizman’s following of the ‘aridity line’.

This is published in his book collaborated with photographer Fazal Sheikh called The Conflict Shoreline (2015). The ‘aridity line’ is what is usually considered to be around 200mm of annual rainfall. This level of precipitation has been considered the minimum needed for growing crops on a large scale, anything less is considered ‘desert’. This line is in no way static, and can move as a result of human influences such as cyclical drought or human attempts to ‘green’ deserts.

Following this aridity line on a map, Weizman simultaneously mapped Western drone strikes and found what he calls an ‘astounding coincidence’. As Klein explains:

‘When you map the targets of Western drone strikes onto the region, you see that many of these attacks – from South Waziristan through northern Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Iraq, Gaza and Libya – are directly on or close to the 200mm aridity line.’

But what explains this shocking coincidence? Klein continues:

 ‘The connection between water and heat stress and conflict is a recurring, intensifying pattern all along the aridity line: all along it you see places marked by drought, water scarcity, scorching temperatures and military conflict – from Libya to Palestine, to some of the bloodiest battlefields in Afghanistan and Pakistan… first, Western fighter jets followed that abundance of oil; now, Western drones are closely shadowing the lack of water, as drought exacerbates conflict.’

Although the main focus of his book is on the Middle East, in particular the conflicts surrounding the Palestinian Bedouins and the fluctuations of the desert threshold in this area, in an earlier interview Weizman spoke about this conflict pattern in relation to Africa:

‘In past decades, conflicts have broken out in most countries from East to West Africa, along this shoreline: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal’.

I wonder if this is merely coincidence or if there really is a correlation between low water levels in Africa and conflict, so have tried to do some exploration. I’ve looked at timelines of recent events leading up to both the Somalia and Mali drone strikes highlighted in Weizman’s maps, trying to determine whether there is any distant connection between the strikes and water availability.

In both cases, I found mentioning of water scarcity (such as 2005 food shortages in Mali after severe drought; severe drought in the 70’s in Somalia (BBC, 2016)), but there are also a plethora of other historical and modern political tensions that have led to this, so it is really very hard to make a definitive conclusion. A huge study comparing a variety of areas and their history’s I think is needed to do that, and with my current time frame I’m not sure that is quite possible…

Nevertheless! I also looked up more maps showing western drone strikes in Africa, and sure enough, they very clearly follow the same pattern that Weizman’s aridity line map shows! So maybe there is something to it.

Source: https://crossedcrocodiles.wordpress.com

It really is a very striking similarity, which I am fascinated by. I would love to find out more about this in future. I wonder if any of you readers have any more insight into this?

Weizman, E and Sheikh, F (2015) The Conflict Shoreline: Colonisation as Climate Change in the Negev Desert, Göttingen: Steidl.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 (Somalia timeline)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978 (Mali timeline)

Hydro-colonialism?

Hello again! And welcome back to my blog on Water and Politics in Africa.

For this weeks post I want to connect the past and the present by looking at the political occurance of something called ‘hydro-colonialism’. It is something that until researching I was completely unaware of, but since looking deeper into it has become extremely shocking to me.

Colonialism itself is deeply embedded in the history of Africa.  The 19^th and 20^th centuries saw the height of this, where African countries were subjected to European invasions and pillaging of resources. Colonial acts still connect to water availability in Africa today. A study by Njoh and Akiwama (2011) has actually hinted that colonialism has been a benefit to African water availability, stating that those counties that experienced colonialism the longest now have better infrastructure. Though this may true to a small extent, there are larger issues of colonialism in relation to water access that should not be pushed aside. Namely, issues surrounding unequal water allocations after the creation of new colonial states, such as problems relating to the 1959 colonial deal dividing the water rights to the Nile between Sudan and Egypt, leaving other countries in the basin fully excluded (Grain, 2012).

The acts and impacts of colonialism are not just something located in the past, however.

In fact, it can be said that there are still very much so features of colonialism or ‘neo-colonialism’ occurring on this very day, through acts of land grabbing. Grain, an NGO working to support small farmers globally has named this ‘hydro-colonialism’ due to the large quantities of water on such land being used.

A recently published document by LandMatrix reports on the extent and impact of land acquisitions that are occurring globally today. LandMatrix is based on its own database recording intended, concluded and failed land acquisitions since the year 2000. The data is mainly collected company annual reports, corporate presentations and media releases on stock exchanges. Although this data may not be fully reliable (i.e. they state that some contacts fail to incorporate specific locational data), I found it a good, clear place to start exploring the topic. Using this report then, my aim here is to highlight the key points in relation to Africa and try to determine to what extent land grabbing can count as a form of ‘hydro-colonialism’.

So, what is land grabbing? Oxfam (2016: no pagination) put it bluntly; ‘it's when governments, banks or private investors buy up huge plots of land to make equally huge profits.’

As seen in this image provided by Land-Matrix (2016), globally, Africa remains the most targeted area of land-acquisition. In fact, the document states they found 422 concluded agricultural deals, which involve a total area of 10million hectares. Looking closer at this patterning of land deals in Africa and something of interest arises – the land deals seem to follow water. The area along the River Nile is highlighted, similarly in Senegal along the Senegal River and Mali along the Niger. Already therefore, by the fact that water seems to play a large factor in the land acquired, there are hints towards it potentially being a form of hydro-colonialism.

This idea is further backed up when understanding what the land is used for, who uses it, and how it is gained. In relation to Africa, the report highlights that predominant use of land is for agriculture. In terms of who gains and uses this land, it is usually foreign countries and multinational companies. For example many Saudi Arabian companies have been acquiring land in African countries such as Ethiopia in order to produce food to ship home (Grain, 2012). Agriculture of course needs water. Through land acquisition in Africa therefore, these actors are able to grow food, produce energy, pursue touristic businesses etc. all through use of African water, and not their own nation's. Again, the term ‘hydro-colonialism’ seems very relevant.

The plots of land are also often not unused, but in fact occupied by smallholder farmers, for whom the land, and the water on it, serves as a key part of their livelihoods, and in fact accounts for over half of most country’s GDP and two thirds of the labour force in Africa (FAO, 2001). Yet, this land can and is taken away due to low levels of tenure security. ‘Such conditions create opportunities for investors to acquire quick access to large tracts of lands within legal systems that give little scope for local populations to defend their own rights to land’ the LandMatrix report (2016: 20) explains.

The impacts on these smallholder farmers are massive. As mentioned the livelihoods and food security of farmers working directly on the land is taken away. Yet, the report highlights how even ‘marginal’ land grabbed impacts on people, by reducing resources such as firewood and timber, or grazing areas for rural and indigenous people. There is rarely consultation with these people affected, and inequality levels in the areas are likely to increase.

Can land grabbing be seen as a form of ‘hydro-colonialism’ then? In short, I think yes. Although many argue that land grabbing is beneficial to those in areas taken through job opportunities. I believe there are clearly more negative impacts. With the high majority of land grabs relating to water, or impacting on the water provisions of locals, I believe that hydro-colonialism is a good way to describe much of the land grabbing occurring in Africa.

Dixon, J et al., (2001) Framework for analysing impacts of globalisation on smallholders (WWW) FAO (fao.org; 17/10/16)

Grain, (2012) Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind every land grab is a water grab, (WWW), Grain, (grain.org; 16/10/16).

Njoh, A and Akiwumi, F (2011) The impact of colonization on access to improved water in African cities, Cities, 28, 5, 452-460.

Nolte, K, Chamberlain, W, Giger, M (2016) International Land Deals for Agriculture. Fresh insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II, Montpellier: Bern Open Publishing.

Oxfam (2016) Guide to land grabs, (WWW) Oxfam (Oxfam.org.uk; 17/10/16)