BBC News article on Zimbabwe

Source: BBC News

This is a short post just to draw attention to this BBC news article that I found last week. You can read the article here:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38103849

The reason I draw attention to it is that it covers both themes from my last post on inequality as well as points towards my next planned post on the private/public water provisioning debate.

The article, by Shingai Nyoka is titled 'Zimbabwe water shortages: 'I don't remember taking a shower'. It looks at the current water situation for people in Zimbabwe's capital Harare.

The key issue stated in the article is that the public water provisioner, Zimbabwe National Water Authority, 'lacks funds to treat water and has also been unable to maintain its ageing water pipes'.

More affluent areas of Harare, water tankers are able to provide for homes. However the high costs mean only the richest can access this.

The article states: 'The same volume of water from the Zimbabwe National Water Authority would cost just 10% as much - if it was actually available'.

The article therefore points to problematics associated with both public and private water provisioning as well as the issue of inequality.

The article also points to 'bottom up' private entrepreneurship, with the case study of Anna Malikezi who wakes early to get to the water pumps and then sells it to her community. This brings in another dynamic to the private/public debate and pulls on some ideas expressed by a recent lecture we had from Tatiana which pulled from Business in Development literature.

After reading this I may well use Harare as a main case study in my next post.

To what extent is inequality a factor in water access?

Saturday was World Toilet Day, a day marked by the UN to highlight the importance of toilets worldwide.

And it is true, they are of great importance. Toilets, though something often not paid much attention, are the centres of a multitude of social distinctions.

‘Almost two-thirds of Ghanaians (64%) are at risk of engaging in open defecation because they do not have toilets in their homes or in their compounds. This proportion has hardly changed since 2012(65%).’ Similar instances can be found across Sub-Saharan Africa.

Reading around the matter, one of the main ideas that has become apparent is that of inequality. Despite much easier, more sustainable and cheaper alternatives to the porcelain ‘flush’ toilet that we are all used to in our homes, the latter carries a certain image. With references to colonial legacy, these toilets are possessed by the highest income groups, with fully piped water supply, and have thereby become both a symbol of status, as well as ‘civility’  in many urban centres in Africa. This is furthered by narratives such as that offered in an article by The Economist  linking flushing toilets with progress (echoing modernisation discourses). With flushing toilets thereby seen as the ultimate goal, other attempts at toilet provisioning can be seen as ‘not good enough’ or have cultural stigmas attached to them. Inequality thereby increases inequality by producing a negative cycle.

Even in those areas where toilets have been implemented inequality is an issue, with the privately owned stalls being too much for many too afford. Joel Nkako (Kenyas' Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (Tatiana Thieme Lecture 2016)), in 2010 made some important points in relation to toilet provisioning:

‘You have to see the coverage and access and usage of facilities like latrines. Sometimes we use a single word, like when we say we want to scale up latrine ‘coverage’. What we mean is we want many people to use toilets and maybe stop open defecation. But when we use the word coverage, it does not ensure usage or access, because if we walk around we’ll find places where toilets are locked. They are used by specific people, and excluding others. And access also does not translate into proper usage.’

The reason I mention all of this is because I feel there exist parallels between inequalities surrounding toilet access to access to water. For the rest of this post I want to make apparent these parallels and demonstrate the importance of inequality in understanding access to water in Africa’s urban centres.

The poor paying more for less?

The way in which I hope to draw some parallels starts with the Joel Nkako quote just mentioned above.

Firstly, the statement: ‘when we use the word coverage, it does not ensure usage or access’. This idea can also be used to explore issues surrounding water access in Africa. It has been made clear that when understanding access to water, National Water Scarcity metrics are unhelpful. Those in the  slums of Nairobi face shortages of clean water, whilst their neighbours in affluent suburbs have enough water not only for household use, but enough to keep swimming pools filled (UNDP, 2006: 80) . Clearly therefore, there is much more to inability to access water than national metrics. Rather, it is the destructing issue of inequality.

A second part of Joel Nkako’s speech can also relate to water issues and help us understand this inequality to a greater level: “[Toilets] are used by specific people… excluding others.” Doing research into water inequalities in African urban centres and I was shocked to find the statement that, in regard to water  ‘the poor pay more – and get less water’. Looking further and I found that it is true: 'People living in the slums of Nairobi... actually pay 5 to 10 times more for water than those in high income areas of [the] same city'. Amartya Sen’s theory of entitlements is able to help us understand this paradox further. Drawing attention ‘to market structures, institutional rules and patterns of service provision’, this theory refers ‘not to rights or moral claims in a normative sense but the ability of people to secure a good or service through a legally recognised and enforceable claim on a provider’ (UNDP, 2006: 80).

‘Entitlements’ help us understand how those with enough income are able to afford piped water supply to be fitted into their homes. It also helps us understand how poorer persons can often only access this piped supply through vendors or water kiosks which - due to economies of scale, and the hiking up of price as the water passes through the marketing chain - ends up costing much more per unit for the poor. This can be up to twice the price of piped supplies (Thompson, 2000). (The same can be said of private communal toilets where often the price per use is too much for parents to justify infants or themselves using). Due to this high cost therefore the poorest have to spread out their access to water, including low quality and long distance sources. Clearly therefore economic inequality has vast impacts on water access for poorer persons.  

The last parallel I wish to briefly make (although I stress this is in no ways a small issue that much time could be dedicated to) is that of gender inequality. Both the act of collecting water and using the toilet are risky acts for women, where they are often vulnerable to attack on route. ‘To avoid this, women and girls avoid drinking, and hold back the urge to go to the toilet for long periods of time, risking dehydration, bladder and kidney infections, and other health impacts’, Léo Heller, UN Special Rapporteur on Human rights to water and sanitation states.

I am not trying to say that access to toilets and access to water are the same issue in any sense. Rather, I have used a comparison here to highlight a core issues that both suffer from: that of inequality. In response to the title’s question, I believe that inequality is a massive component in determining shortage of access to clean water. The human right to water ‘entitles everyone to sufficient, safe acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use’. More needs to be done to reduce inequalities that interfere with this right.

Many of the issues stated here about water access can be related back to private vs. public debates around water servicing. Next week's post will be aiming to untangle that debate. This post can therefore be viewed as a precursor to next weeks, where some of the themes mentioned will be reiterated. I look forward to looking into it.


UNDP (2006) Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: power, poverty and the global water crisis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 

Thompson et al., (2000) Waiting at the tap: changes in urban water use in East Africa over three decades, Environment and Urbanisation, 12, 2, 37-52.

The Politics of Integrated Water Resources Management

Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), it can be said, is one of the foremost paradigms in water resource management in Africa currently. It has been promoted by multilateral and bilateral donors, and is the flagship project of international bodies such as the Global Water Partnership (Mehta, 2015). Importantly, IWRM has been incorporated into many water policies and strategies in the nations of Africa.

IWRM has exploded on the water scene in Africa, and I want to understand more about it. I want to understand the politics of it’s success - how has it become so popular? Is it really that great? What have been the results?

But, before all this… what exactly is IWRM?

The most commonly referred to definition for Integrated Water Resources Management is that provided by the Global Water Partnership. It is defined as:

'A process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems'.

With a focus on what is known as the ‘3 E’s’ (Efficiency, Equity, Ecological Integrity) IWRM aims to include the integration of all stakeholders in a basin to produce more a more holistic, participatory and harmonious strategy of water sharing (Van der Zaag, 2005).

Sounds great! In fact so great that it has been taken forward as the most popular method for water management today. It is rare to find a single paradigm become quite so popular, and I think this is therefore important - why has it become so popular?

…What are the politics behind the spread and uptake of this method in Africa?

There has been much speculation – both for and against the strategy – as to why IWRM has become so popular, both globally and in Africa.

It seems there are a plethora of reasons those in support of the method believe it has been so successful. Firstly, after decades of dam construction and resultant criticism of this method, IWRM arrived and spread in the 90’s when global focus was turning to ‘soft’ management strategies (Mehta, 2015). For example, Adams (1985) highlights how the construction of the Baklori Dam in Nigeria caused extensive downstream issues (to fishing, agriculture and the economy). With IWRM encouraging downstream-upstream linkages the method was therefore seen as very favorable to dam critics (Van der Zaag, 2005). Furthermore, previous strategies for water management were increasingly coming under fire for being too sub-sectoral and disconnected, as Biswas (2004:249) clearly states it, water management was seen to have become:

 ‘Multi-dimensional, multi-sectoral, and multi-regional and filled with multi-interests, multi-agendas, and multi-causes, and which can be resolved through a proper multi-institutional and multi-stakeholder coordination.’

This lack of coordination led to more debates in water management strategies, which came to a head in a UNCED conference in Rio in 1992 were the concepts of IWRM were debated (Savenijie and Van der Zaag, 2008).

Those more wary of the approach have scathed its popularity as being a result of it being a  ‘Wishy-Washy’ method that allows people to continue what they are doing, but now with a trendy, up to date label of using the latest paradigm. For example, Biswas (2004) again in his paper is left with many questions after reading the Global Water Partnership definition:

Who is doing the promoting? What is meant by land and ‘related resources’ (does this mean agriculture, energy, or what?)? What specifically is being maximized? And what is precisely meant by equitable?

Indeed, it is quite hard to be sure.

Overall on paper however, I think it can be said that IWRM probably has more positives than negatives, although negatives of course do exist. 

We will now turn to look at the strategy in practice.

How does IWRM play out in real life?

Just as there are binaries in why IWRM has become so popular in Africa, there are even stronger opinions surrounding the success of this strategy in practice.

Nigeria’s Komadugu-YobeRiver Basin has been called a success case of IWRM. Located upstream of Lake Chad, dam construction and irrigation caused falling river levels leading to conflict and impacts on livelihoods. As part of an IWRM approach, governments and civil society agreed to a water charter whereby farmers, fishermen and herders joined in plans to restore the river. The results have reportedly been a restoration of the rivers flow locally, improvement in livelihoods and also less conflict.

However, it seems that criticisms have been far and wide; I don’t know if that because critical voices are often heard louder or if this is a sign that IWRM is, in fact, the wrong strategy. Nevertheless, IWRM in practice has been scathed as…

… Being too abstract. 

As mentioned earlier, the criteria for IWRM can be seen as rather ‘wishy-washy’. For example, in water-rich Uganda, the paradigm of IWRM was used but focus was placed on regulating water and introducing neoliberal reform, rather than on allocating water to those who needed it (Mehta, 2015), something that many would criticise.

… Lacking recognition of local level realities.

Looking at the implementation of IWRM in South Africa Mehta et al., (2014) have highlighted how the policies failed to fully recognize the complexities and inequalities of the context, leading to lack of participation and minimal farmer power.

… Being too difficult. 

It is hard to ever really gain full participation of all actors in a basin. Mehta (2015) demonstrates the case of Mozambique, where elites trained in the Netherlands implemented IWRM in the late 90’s. The colonial legacy of a centralized state however meant efforts at creating truly participatory institutions were stunted.

Where does this leave us?

Overall therefore I think a small attempt at a conclusion can be made. From the research I have done it would seem that, on paper, the popularity and – in many ways – need for IWRM is clear. On paper there are much more positives than negatives that an IWRM approach can offer. The fallback mainly comes in implementation, as seen it appears there are actually more negatives (so far) than positives.

With my still very limited knowledge therefore I can only make a tentative recommendation that the ideas behind IWRM must be taken seriously, as they clearly have some stamina in solving issues around water management. But at the same time I think that not every single person can ever be satisfied in such large basin regions with so many complex and different participants. Future attempts at IWRM therefore might need to be more clear-cut, understanding that it is almost impossible for everyone to be satisfied, but doing the best that can be realistically achieved. I also believe that water infrastructure projects also need to be prioritized and not ignored by IWRM.

Adams, W.M. 1985 The downstream impacts of dam construction: a case study from Nigeria . Trans.I.B.G., 10(3), pp 292-302.

Biswas, A.K., 2004. Integrated Water Resources Management: A Reassessment. Water International 29 (2), 248–256.

Mehta et al., (2014) Learning from Southern Africa on Fair and Effective Integrated Water Resources Management,

Mehta, L (2015) Politics of Integrated Water Resources Management in southern Africa, (WWW) Institute of Development Studies (ids.ac.uk; 12/11/16).

Savenijie, H.G. and Van der Zaag, P. 2008. Integrated water resources management:  concepts and issues. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 33, 290-297.

Van der Zaag, P. 2005. Integrated Water Resources Management: Relevant concept or irrelevant buzzword? A capacity building and research agenda for Southern Africa, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 30, 867-871.

The Scarcity-Causes-Violence Paradigm Continued...

My last blog post was frustrating because, although I found Eyal Weizman’s aridity map fascinating, I found myself feeling as though I was at a dead end for answers about whether water scarcity really can be a cause of conflict (that has resultantly lead to Western drone strikes).

Not wanting to let the matter go… I am on a mission in this post to try and look more deeply at the discussion.

Googling the issue and you would almost certainly believe that yes, ‘water scarcity’ very much so is a cause of concern in relation to violent conflict. The Guardian has warned that climate change is going to bring global threats of both terrorism and war. Al Jazeera similarly warns that ‘almost half of humanity will face water scarcity by 2030’ and even offers an interactive map they made to show areas where water scarcity may have connected to conflict. In 2011, the World Economic Forum included water as one of the world’s top five risks for the first time in its Global Risk Report.

An example of Al Jazeera's water scarcity-conflict map. This Kenya example is  responded to later on in this post - see case study.

This mainstream thinking especially focuses on regions characterised by poverty. It assumes conflict in these areas is more likely to occur due to high levels of population growth and high dependency on natural resources, as well as the idea that poor countries are unable to allocate enough wealth to research and development in order to produce/substitute scare resources (Witsenburg and Wario Rosa, 2007). There are also arguments that:

‘Poor countries start at a disadvantage, many are underendowed with the social institutions that are necessary for an ample supply of both social and technical solutions to scarcity…’ (Dixon, 1999:108)

These arguments are known as Malthusian or neo-Malthusian, based on Malthus’ predictions of conflict or ‘tragedy of the commons’ due to either environmental supply issues (i.e. drought), or population growth.

However, there are arguments against these theories. To start, looking at the definitions of ‘water scarcity’ defined, it is Falkenmark’s (1989) criteria of  access to <1000 cubic metres per person annually, which, as highlighted in my first blog can be denounced as a highly unreliable. Therefore the claims to conflict on that back of this ‘scarcity’ can also be seen as unreliable.  Selby (2012) highlight how many studies have concluded that evidence of environmental conflict, and that, especially in relation to water, scarcities have actually tended to facilitate cooperation rather than contribute to conflict.  She also highlights how liberal political economists have argued that the reason there has been a historical absence of ‘water wars’ is that, with water being far from a finite resource, it is readily importable through water treatment and reuse or through the importation of virtual water’.

Case study: Is there a link between water scarcity and violent conflict in Kenya’s Drylands?

So far in my blog posts I haven’t really focused in too closely on any specific area or locality, though have been keen to do so soon. Sitting in the library I found myself opposite a book called ‘Conflicts over land and water in Africa’, which upon looking at the contents I found had a chapter written by Karen Witsenburg and Adano Wario Roba (2007) directly seeking to answer the question I am hoping to understand, with a specific focus on the Marsabit District in Kenya.  I think it gives an interesting response to the scarcity-causes-violence paradigm. 

Photo of the Marsibit Landscape

The chapter looks at the Marsabit District in Northern Kenya. The Marsabit region is characterized by volcanic mountains and surround semi-desert land. The average rainfall ranges from 800-1000 mm annually, though this can drop to around 200mm in the surrounding low lands (aridity). The region is inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups, most of them pastoralists, who have moved across the Ethiopian border for hundreds of years. Some of the ethinic groups include The Boran, Gabra, Somali, Dasenetch, Burji, and the Garri amongst many others.

“These groups have histories of animosity, friendship, temporal alliances and violent conflict”

Through interviews with users of the Bokoto well as well as secondary statistical data, they aimed to determine whether there were tensions over access rights to water resources and, if so, whether this was related to increasing population pressure. They also wanted to see how this this played out over both long and short term.

Looking at the course of the 1900’s they analysed rainfall data that showed that there has been an increasing amount of dry years towards the end of the century (with two years of <500mm before 1960 and seven years after). The late 1990’s also saw an escalation of ethnic violent conflicts in the region, leading to ninety-three deaths in 1998 and thirty-eight in 1999.  Is this connected to water scarcity though?

In 2000 severe drought was experienced in the region. Interviewing people at the Bokoto well the writers actually found that the user groups reported less conflict in times of drought ‘for sheer survival’. The different ethnic groups usually in conflict sought to reconcile their issues in times of drought in order to be able to access the less available water holes. Conflict is actually higher in wet years; they reported how higher grasses facilitate more raider attacks, and that animals are stronger and therefore able to walk further distances. Comparing this with colonial records they found a similar phenomenon recorded.

This is a very interesting insight which taken face value would go against Weizman’s theory that conflict follows water scarcity. However, this is only a small region, and one could argue relatively ‘small scale’ conflicts in relation to those that attract foreign intervention; it would be interesting to look at the likelihood of ‘water scarcity’ being a direct cause of conflict in those cases.

Overall however, I think from the analysis here I would agree with the UN that

‘While conflicts over water resources are common, there is effectively no known case where these have constituted the primary motivation for full- scale war. Rather, the very centrality of water makes cooperation a more likely response, evidenced in the much stronger record of cooperation. Violent conflicts are more likely to occur at the local level between competing user groups that are also divided along ethnic, religious or other lines.’

Homer-Dixon, T (1999) The Environment, Scarcity and Violence, New York: Princeton University Press.

Selby, J (2012) Water scarcity, conflict, and migration: a comparative analysis and reappraisal, Environment and Planning C, 30, 997-1014.

Witsenburg, K and Wario Roba, A (2007) The Use & Management of Water Sources in Kenya’s Drylands: is there a link between scarcity and violent conflicts? In Derman, B and Sjaastad, E (eds.) Conflicts Over Land and Water in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 215-239.