The Scarcity-Causes-Violence Paradigm Continued...

My last blog post was frustrating because, although I found Eyal Weizman’s aridity map fascinating, I found myself feeling as though I was at a dead end for answers about whether water scarcity really can be a cause of conflict (that has resultantly lead to Western drone strikes).

Not wanting to let the matter go… I am on a mission in this post to try and look more deeply at the discussion.

Googling the issue and you would almost certainly believe that yes, ‘water scarcity’ very much so is a cause of concern in relation to violent conflict. The Guardian has warned that climate change is going to bring global threats of both terrorism and war. Al Jazeera similarly warns that ‘almost half of humanity will face water scarcity by 2030’ and even offers an interactive map they made to show areas where water scarcity may have connected to conflict. In 2011, the World Economic Forum included water as one of the world’s top five risks for the first time in its Global Risk Report.

An example of Al Jazeera's water scarcity-conflict map. This Kenya example is  responded to later on in this post - see case study.

This mainstream thinking especially focuses on regions characterised by poverty. It assumes conflict in these areas is more likely to occur due to high levels of population growth and high dependency on natural resources, as well as the idea that poor countries are unable to allocate enough wealth to research and development in order to produce/substitute scare resources (Witsenburg and Wario Rosa, 2007). There are also arguments that:

‘Poor countries start at a disadvantage, many are underendowed with the social institutions that are necessary for an ample supply of both social and technical solutions to scarcity…’ (Dixon, 1999:108)

These arguments are known as Malthusian or neo-Malthusian, based on Malthus’ predictions of conflict or ‘tragedy of the commons’ due to either environmental supply issues (i.e. drought), or population growth.

However, there are arguments against these theories. To start, looking at the definitions of ‘water scarcity’ defined, it is Falkenmark’s (1989) criteria of  access to <1000 cubic metres per person annually, which, as highlighted in my first blog can be denounced as a highly unreliable. Therefore the claims to conflict on that back of this ‘scarcity’ can also be seen as unreliable.  Selby (2012) highlight how many studies have concluded that evidence of environmental conflict, and that, especially in relation to water, scarcities have actually tended to facilitate cooperation rather than contribute to conflict.  She also highlights how liberal political economists have argued that the reason there has been a historical absence of ‘water wars’ is that, with water being far from a finite resource, it is readily importable through water treatment and reuse or through the importation of virtual water’.

Case study: Is there a link between water scarcity and violent conflict in Kenya’s Drylands?

So far in my blog posts I haven’t really focused in too closely on any specific area or locality, though have been keen to do so soon. Sitting in the library I found myself opposite a book called ‘Conflicts over land and water in Africa’, which upon looking at the contents I found had a chapter written by Karen Witsenburg and Adano Wario Roba (2007) directly seeking to answer the question I am hoping to understand, with a specific focus on the Marsabit District in Kenya.  I think it gives an interesting response to the scarcity-causes-violence paradigm. 

Photo of the Marsibit Landscape

The chapter looks at the Marsabit District in Northern Kenya. The Marsabit region is characterized by volcanic mountains and surround semi-desert land. The average rainfall ranges from 800-1000 mm annually, though this can drop to around 200mm in the surrounding low lands (aridity). The region is inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups, most of them pastoralists, who have moved across the Ethiopian border for hundreds of years. Some of the ethinic groups include The Boran, Gabra, Somali, Dasenetch, Burji, and the Garri amongst many others.

“These groups have histories of animosity, friendship, temporal alliances and violent conflict”

Through interviews with users of the Bokoto well as well as secondary statistical data, they aimed to determine whether there were tensions over access rights to water resources and, if so, whether this was related to increasing population pressure. They also wanted to see how this this played out over both long and short term.

Looking at the course of the 1900’s they analysed rainfall data that showed that there has been an increasing amount of dry years towards the end of the century (with two years of <500mm before 1960 and seven years after). The late 1990’s also saw an escalation of ethnic violent conflicts in the region, leading to ninety-three deaths in 1998 and thirty-eight in 1999.  Is this connected to water scarcity though?

In 2000 severe drought was experienced in the region. Interviewing people at the Bokoto well the writers actually found that the user groups reported less conflict in times of drought ‘for sheer survival’. The different ethnic groups usually in conflict sought to reconcile their issues in times of drought in order to be able to access the less available water holes. Conflict is actually higher in wet years; they reported how higher grasses facilitate more raider attacks, and that animals are stronger and therefore able to walk further distances. Comparing this with colonial records they found a similar phenomenon recorded.

This is a very interesting insight which taken face value would go against Weizman’s theory that conflict follows water scarcity. However, this is only a small region, and one could argue relatively ‘small scale’ conflicts in relation to those that attract foreign intervention; it would be interesting to look at the likelihood of ‘water scarcity’ being a direct cause of conflict in those cases.

Overall however, I think from the analysis here I would agree with the UN that

‘While conflicts over water resources are common, there is effectively no known case where these have constituted the primary motivation for full- scale war. Rather, the very centrality of water makes cooperation a more likely response, evidenced in the much stronger record of cooperation. Violent conflicts are more likely to occur at the local level between competing user groups that are also divided along ethnic, religious or other lines.’

Homer-Dixon, T (1999) The Environment, Scarcity and Violence, New York: Princeton University Press.

Selby, J (2012) Water scarcity, conflict, and migration: a comparative analysis and reappraisal, Environment and Planning C, 30, 997-1014.

Witsenburg, K and Wario Roba, A (2007) The Use & Management of Water Sources in Kenya’s Drylands: is there a link between scarcity and violent conflicts? In Derman, B and Sjaastad, E (eds.) Conflicts Over Land and Water in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 215-239.