Not wanting to let the matter go… I am on a mission in this
post to try and look more deeply at the discussion.
Googling the issue and you would almost certainly believe
that yes, ‘water scarcity’ very much so is a cause of concern in relation to
violent conflict. The Guardian has
warned that climate change is going to bring global threats of both terrorism
and war. Al Jazeera similarly warns that ‘almost half of humanity will face water scarcity by 2030’
and even offers an interactive map they made to show areas where water scarcity may have
connected to conflict. In 2011, the World Economic Forum included water as one
of the world’s top five risks for the first time in its Global Risk Report.
An example of Al Jazeera's water scarcity-conflict map. This Kenya example is responded to later on in this post - see case study. |
This mainstream thinking especially focuses on regions
characterised by poverty. It assumes conflict in these areas is more likely to
occur due to high levels of population growth and high dependency on natural
resources, as well as the idea that poor countries are unable to allocate
enough wealth to research and development in order to produce/substitute scare
resources (Witsenburg and Wario Rosa, 2007). There are also arguments that:
‘Poor countries start
at a disadvantage, many are underendowed with the social institutions that are
necessary for an ample supply of both social and technical solutions to
scarcity…’ (Dixon, 1999:108)
These arguments are known as Malthusian or neo-Malthusian,
based on Malthus’ predictions of conflict or ‘tragedy of the commons’ due to
either environmental supply issues (i.e. drought), or population growth.
However, there are arguments against these theories. To
start, looking at the definitions of ‘water scarcity’ defined, it is
Falkenmark’s (1989) criteria of access
to <1000 cubic metres per person annually, which, as highlighted in my first
blog can be denounced as a highly unreliable. Therefore the claims to conflict
on that back of this ‘scarcity’ can also be seen as unreliable. Selby (2012) highlight how many studies have concluded that
evidence of environmental conflict, and that, especially in relation to water,
scarcities have actually tended to facilitate cooperation rather than
contribute to conflict. She
also highlights how liberal political economists have argued that the reason
there has been a historical absence of ‘water wars’ is that, with water being
far from a finite resource, it is readily importable through water treatment
and reuse or through the importation of virtual water’.
Case study: Is there a link between water scarcity and
violent conflict in Kenya’s Drylands?
So far in my blog posts I haven’t really focused in too
closely on any specific area or locality, though have been keen to do so soon.
Sitting in the library I found myself opposite a book called ‘Conflicts over
land and water in Africa’, which upon looking at the contents I found had a
chapter written by Karen Witsenburg and Adano Wario Roba (2007) directly seeking to answer the question I am hoping to understand, with
a specific focus on the Marsabit District in Kenya. I think it gives an interesting response to
the scarcity-causes-violence paradigm.
Photo of the Marsibit Landscape |
The chapter
looks at the Marsabit District in Northern Kenya. The Marsabit region is characterized
by volcanic mountains and surround semi-desert land. The average rainfall
ranges from 800-1000 mm annually, though this can drop to around 200mm in the
surrounding low lands (aridity). The region is inhabited by a large number of
ethnic groups, most of them pastoralists, who have moved across the Ethiopian
border for hundreds of years. Some of the ethinic groups include The Boran,
Gabra, Somali, Dasenetch, Burji, and the Garri amongst many others.
“These groups have histories
of animosity, friendship, temporal alliances and violent conflict”
Through
interviews with users of the Bokoto well as well as secondary statistical data,
they aimed to determine whether there were tensions over access rights to water
resources and, if so, whether this was related to increasing population
pressure. They also wanted to see how this this played out over both long and
short term.
Looking at
the course of the 1900’s they analysed rainfall data that showed that there has
been an increasing amount of dry years towards the end of the century (with two
years of <500mm before 1960 and seven years after). The late 1990’s also saw
an escalation of ethnic violent conflicts in the region, leading to ninety-three
deaths in 1998 and thirty-eight in 1999.
Is this connected to water scarcity though?
In 2000
severe drought was experienced in the region. Interviewing people at the Bokoto
well the writers actually found that the user groups reported less conflict in times of drought ‘for sheer survival’. The
different ethnic groups usually in conflict sought to reconcile their issues in
times of drought in order to be able to access the less available water holes.
Conflict is actually higher in wet
years; they reported how higher grasses facilitate more raider attacks, and
that animals are stronger and therefore able to walk further distances.
Comparing this with colonial records they found a similar phenomenon recorded.
This is a
very interesting insight which taken face value would go against Weizman’s
theory that conflict follows water scarcity. However, this is only a small
region, and one could argue relatively ‘small scale’ conflicts in relation to
those that attract foreign intervention; it would be interesting to look at the
likelihood of ‘water scarcity’ being a direct cause of conflict in those cases.
Overall
however, I think from the analysis here I would agree with the UN that
‘While conflicts over water resources
are common, there is effectively no known case where these have constituted the
primary motivation for full- scale war. Rather, the very centrality of water
makes cooperation a more likely response, evidenced in the much stronger record
of cooperation. Violent conflicts are more likely to occur at the local level
between competing user groups that are also divided along ethnic, religious or
other lines.’
Homer-Dixon,
T (1999) The Environment, Scarcity and Violence,
New York: Princeton University Press.
Selby, J (2012) Water scarcity, conflict, and migration: a
comparative analysis and reappraisal, Environment
and Planning C, 30, 997-1014.
Witsenburg, K and Wario Roba, A (2007) The Use &
Management of Water Sources in Kenya’s Drylands: is there a link between scarcity
and violent conflicts? In Derman, B and Sjaastad, E (eds.) Conflicts Over Land and Water in Africa, Oxford: James Currey,
215-239.
This is a very thoughtful post. Something to consider is whether the influence of "water scarcity" or drought on conflict may materialise through a lack of food, rather than water per se. By what metric do Al-Jazeera designate a region or country as "water scarce" - it is unclear.
ReplyDeleteHi Richard.
DeleteThanks for the suggestion, that is an interesting point I will have a look into!
Al-Jazeera uses the Falkenmark criteria for water scarcity, which I come back to and critique a few paragraphs later with the starting sentence 'However, there are arguments against these theories'. I do not make a direct connection though so will keep that in mind when I am writing my future posts!
Thanks again