Conflict following lack of water? Eyal Weizman's tracking of the 'aridity line'

In this blog post I want to comment on something I heard about in a talk at the Southbank Centre last year. The talk was held by Naomi Klein, called ‘Let them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming World’. Celebrating Edward Said’s legacy, she transferred his profound theory of Othering and related it to the current climate crises in a variety of captivating ways. You can see a transcript or listen to a podcast of the talk here if you are interested yourselves.

One of the main things that particularly struck me from the talk, and that I will now make the subject of this blog post, is mention of the famous architect-come-academic Eyal Weizman’s following of the ‘aridity line’.

This is published in his book collaborated with photographer Fazal Sheikh called The Conflict Shoreline (2015). The ‘aridity line’ is what is usually considered to be around 200mm of annual rainfall. This level of precipitation has been considered the minimum needed for growing crops on a large scale, anything less is considered ‘desert’. This line is in no way static, and can move as a result of human influences such as cyclical drought or human attempts to ‘green’ deserts.

Following this aridity line on a map, Weizman simultaneously mapped Western drone strikes and found what he calls an ‘astounding coincidence’. As Klein explains:

‘When you map the targets of Western drone strikes onto the region, you see that many of these attacks – from South Waziristan through northern Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Iraq, Gaza and Libya – are directly on or close to the 200mm aridity line.’

But what explains this shocking coincidence? Klein continues:

 ‘The connection between water and heat stress and conflict is a recurring, intensifying pattern all along the aridity line: all along it you see places marked by drought, water scarcity, scorching temperatures and military conflict – from Libya to Palestine, to some of the bloodiest battlefields in Afghanistan and Pakistan… first, Western fighter jets followed that abundance of oil; now, Western drones are closely shadowing the lack of water, as drought exacerbates conflict.’

Although the main focus of his book is on the Middle East, in particular the conflicts surrounding the Palestinian Bedouins and the fluctuations of the desert threshold in this area, in an earlier interview Weizman spoke about this conflict pattern in relation to Africa:

‘In past decades, conflicts have broken out in most countries from East to West Africa, along this shoreline: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal’.

I wonder if this is merely coincidence or if there really is a correlation between low water levels in Africa and conflict, so have tried to do some exploration. I’ve looked at timelines of recent events leading up to both the Somalia and Mali drone strikes highlighted in Weizman’s maps, trying to determine whether there is any distant connection between the strikes and water availability.

In both cases, I found mentioning of water scarcity (such as 2005 food shortages in Mali after severe drought; severe drought in the 70’s in Somalia (BBC, 2016)), but there are also a plethora of other historical and modern political tensions that have led to this, so it is really very hard to make a definitive conclusion. A huge study comparing a variety of areas and their history’s I think is needed to do that, and with my current time frame I’m not sure that is quite possible…

Nevertheless! I also looked up more maps showing western drone strikes in Africa, and sure enough, they very clearly follow the same pattern that Weizman’s aridity line map shows! So maybe there is something to it.

Source: https://crossedcrocodiles.wordpress.com

It really is a very striking similarity, which I am fascinated by. I would love to find out more about this in future. I wonder if any of you readers have any more insight into this?

Weizman, E and Sheikh, F (2015) The Conflict Shoreline: Colonisation as Climate Change in the Negev Desert, Göttingen: Steidl.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 (Somalia timeline)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978 (Mali timeline)

Hydro-colonialism?

Hello again! And welcome back to my blog on Water and Politics in Africa.

For this weeks post I want to connect the past and the present by looking at the political occurance of something called ‘hydro-colonialism’. It is something that until researching I was completely unaware of, but since looking deeper into it has become extremely shocking to me.

Colonialism itself is deeply embedded in the history of Africa.  The 19^th and 20^th centuries saw the height of this, where African countries were subjected to European invasions and pillaging of resources. Colonial acts still connect to water availability in Africa today. A study by Njoh and Akiwama (2011) has actually hinted that colonialism has been a benefit to African water availability, stating that those counties that experienced colonialism the longest now have better infrastructure. Though this may true to a small extent, there are larger issues of colonialism in relation to water access that should not be pushed aside. Namely, issues surrounding unequal water allocations after the creation of new colonial states, such as problems relating to the 1959 colonial deal dividing the water rights to the Nile between Sudan and Egypt, leaving other countries in the basin fully excluded (Grain, 2012).

The acts and impacts of colonialism are not just something located in the past, however.

In fact, it can be said that there are still very much so features of colonialism or ‘neo-colonialism’ occurring on this very day, through acts of land grabbing. Grain, an NGO working to support small farmers globally has named this ‘hydro-colonialism’ due to the large quantities of water on such land being used.

A recently published document by LandMatrix reports on the extent and impact of land acquisitions that are occurring globally today. LandMatrix is based on its own database recording intended, concluded and failed land acquisitions since the year 2000. The data is mainly collected company annual reports, corporate presentations and media releases on stock exchanges. Although this data may not be fully reliable (i.e. they state that some contacts fail to incorporate specific locational data), I found it a good, clear place to start exploring the topic. Using this report then, my aim here is to highlight the key points in relation to Africa and try to determine to what extent land grabbing can count as a form of ‘hydro-colonialism’.

So, what is land grabbing? Oxfam (2016: no pagination) put it bluntly; ‘it's when governments, banks or private investors buy up huge plots of land to make equally huge profits.’

As seen in this image provided by Land-Matrix (2016), globally, Africa remains the most targeted area of land-acquisition. In fact, the document states they found 422 concluded agricultural deals, which involve a total area of 10million hectares. Looking closer at this patterning of land deals in Africa and something of interest arises – the land deals seem to follow water. The area along the River Nile is highlighted, similarly in Senegal along the Senegal River and Mali along the Niger. Already therefore, by the fact that water seems to play a large factor in the land acquired, there are hints towards it potentially being a form of hydro-colonialism.

This idea is further backed up when understanding what the land is used for, who uses it, and how it is gained. In relation to Africa, the report highlights that predominant use of land is for agriculture. In terms of who gains and uses this land, it is usually foreign countries and multinational companies. For example many Saudi Arabian companies have been acquiring land in African countries such as Ethiopia in order to produce food to ship home (Grain, 2012). Agriculture of course needs water. Through land acquisition in Africa therefore, these actors are able to grow food, produce energy, pursue touristic businesses etc. all through use of African water, and not their own nation's. Again, the term ‘hydro-colonialism’ seems very relevant.

The plots of land are also often not unused, but in fact occupied by smallholder farmers, for whom the land, and the water on it, serves as a key part of their livelihoods, and in fact accounts for over half of most country’s GDP and two thirds of the labour force in Africa (FAO, 2001). Yet, this land can and is taken away due to low levels of tenure security. ‘Such conditions create opportunities for investors to acquire quick access to large tracts of lands within legal systems that give little scope for local populations to defend their own rights to land’ the LandMatrix report (2016: 20) explains.

The impacts on these smallholder farmers are massive. As mentioned the livelihoods and food security of farmers working directly on the land is taken away. Yet, the report highlights how even ‘marginal’ land grabbed impacts on people, by reducing resources such as firewood and timber, or grazing areas for rural and indigenous people. There is rarely consultation with these people affected, and inequality levels in the areas are likely to increase.

Can land grabbing be seen as a form of ‘hydro-colonialism’ then? In short, I think yes. Although many argue that land grabbing is beneficial to those in areas taken through job opportunities. I believe there are clearly more negative impacts. With the high majority of land grabs relating to water, or impacting on the water provisions of locals, I believe that hydro-colonialism is a good way to describe much of the land grabbing occurring in Africa.

Dixon, J et al., (2001) Framework for analysing impacts of globalisation on smallholders (WWW) FAO (fao.org; 17/10/16)

Grain, (2012) Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind every land grab is a water grab, (WWW), Grain, (grain.org; 16/10/16).

Njoh, A and Akiwumi, F (2011) The impact of colonization on access to improved water in African cities, Cities, 28, 5, 452-460.

Nolte, K, Chamberlain, W, Giger, M (2016) International Land Deals for Agriculture. Fresh insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II, Montpellier: Bern Open Publishing.

Oxfam (2016) Guide to land grabs, (WWW) Oxfam (Oxfam.org.uk; 17/10/16)

Water, Politics and 'Access'

Welcome to my new blog

Water scarcity is an issue of massive importance in Africa. With the African continent’s population expecting to have doubled to 2.4 billion by 2050 (UN, 2015), and water being an absolute necessary resource for human existence, there is a huge pressure for effective policymaking to ensure that everyone can receive their minimum water needs.

Predominant lines of research currently looking at water scarcity in Africa often focus on the instance of physical or natural characteristics. However, access to water in Africa is determined hugely by politics globally, nationally, and locally. A focus on both the politics of, as well as policy making to alleviate, water scarcity is therefore essential to tackling the problem.

It is with this mind-set that this blog has been set up! Over the course of the next few weeks I hope to begin to unpack the different ways politics is bound up in the issue of water scarcity in Africa. Politics determine how different people acquire different levels of power over a given situation. In relation to water in Africa therefore, politics at different scales have a huge impact on levels of access. Through this blog series I wish to explore the power relations embedded in water availability, especially in relation to globalisation. 

Some preliminary areas I am going to cover therefore include:

• the impact of (hydro)colonialism
• zooming in to a small scale case study on local politics at the tap
• the impacts of urban water privatisation 
• water and conflict - is there a connection?
• discourse and the media - is there a true portrayal of Africa's water crises?
• policy approaches to water access

To start with my exploration, the earlier mentioned notion of ‘access’ is something that I would like to expand on, as it is a theme that will be likely to thread through many of my upcoming posts.

'Access'

To me, the notion of 'access' is integral to exploring the politics of water provision. You could have a lake of the cleanest water, but without access to it, it is not of any use. Despite this however, much work surrounding water availability in Africa (i.e. Falkenmark, 1989) fails to mention this key facet. Zeitoun (2016) calls such approaches 'reductionist', and they are often favoured for their ability to be easily used in comparing multiple countries. Their broad nature looking at whole countries and thereby lacking specificity of local phenomena leads to easy and dramatic statistics. 

The World Health Organisation has produced a definition for 'access' to water as an individual living within 200m of an improved water source. Yet, even this definition does not account for access in terms of water quality, nor the huge impact of access in relation to politics.

To reiterate therefore, this blog seeks to understand how politics is related to water, specifically in relation to access. Over the next few weeks I hope that this blog will be able to give me a better understanding of the role of politics in water provision in Africa...

I look forward to seeing what I can find!

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables. Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.241.

Zeitoun, M et al., (2016) Reductionist and integrative research approaches to complex water security policy challenges, Global Environmental Change, 39, 143-154.

Falkenmark, M (1989) The massive water scarcity threatening Africa-why isn't it being addresseed, Ambio 18, no. 2 (1989): 112-118.