In
this blog post I want to comment on something I heard about in a talk at the
Southbank Centre last year. The talk was held by Naomi Klein, called ‘Let them
Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming World’. Celebrating Edward Said’s legacy,
she transferred his profound theory of Othering and related it to the current
climate crises in a variety of captivating ways. You can see a transcript or
listen to a podcast of the talk here if you are interested yourselves.
One
of the main things that particularly struck me from the talk, and that I
will now make the subject of this blog post, is mention of the famous architect-come-academic Eyal Weizman’s following of the ‘aridity line’.
This
is published in his book collaborated with photographer Fazal Sheikh called The Conflict Shoreline (2015). The ‘aridity
line’ is what is usually considered to be around 200mm of annual rainfall. This
level of precipitation has been considered the minimum needed for growing crops
on a large scale, anything less is considered ‘desert’. This line is in no way
static, and can move as a result of human influences such as cyclical drought
or human attempts to ‘green’ deserts.
Following
this aridity line on a map, Weizman simultaneously mapped Western drone strikes
and found what he calls an ‘astounding coincidence’. As Klein explains:
‘When you map the targets of Western drone
strikes onto the region, you see that many of these attacks – from South
Waziristan through northern Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Iraq, Gaza and Libya – are
directly on or close to the 200mm aridity line.’
But
what explains this shocking coincidence? Klein continues:
‘The connection between water and heat stress and conflict is a
recurring, intensifying pattern all along the aridity line: all along it you
see places marked by drought, water scarcity, scorching temperatures and
military conflict – from Libya to Palestine, to some of the bloodiest
battlefields in Afghanistan and Pakistan… first, Western fighter jets followed that abundance of oil; now, Western
drones are closely shadowing the lack of water, as drought exacerbates conflict.’
Although
the main focus of his book is on the Middle East, in particular the conflicts
surrounding the Palestinian Bedouins and the fluctuations of the desert
threshold in this area, in an earlier interview Weizman spoke about this conflict pattern in relation to Africa:
‘In past decades, conflicts have
broken out in most countries from East to West Africa, along this shoreline: Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal’.
I wonder
if this is merely coincidence or if there really is a correlation between low
water levels in Africa and conflict, so have tried to do some exploration. I’ve looked at
timelines of recent events leading up to both the Somalia and Mali drone
strikes highlighted in Weizman’s maps, trying to determine whether there is any
distant connection between the strikes and water availability.
In both
cases, I found mentioning of water scarcity (such as 2005 food shortages in
Mali after severe drought; severe drought in the 70’s in Somalia (BBC, 2016)),
but there are also a plethora of other historical and modern political tensions
that have led to this, so it is really very hard to make a definitive
conclusion. A huge study comparing a variety of areas and their history’s I
think is needed to do that, and with my current time frame I’m not sure that is
quite possible…
Nevertheless!
I also looked up more maps showing western drone strikes in Africa, and sure
enough, they very clearly follow the same pattern that Weizman’s aridity line
map shows! So maybe there is something to it.
Source: https://crossedcrocodiles.wordpress.com |
It really
is a very striking similarity, which I am fascinated by. I would love to find
out more about this in future. I wonder if any of you readers have any more
insight into this?
Weizman, E and Sheikh, F (2015) The Conflict Shoreline: Colonisation as Climate Change in the Negev Desert, Göttingen: Steidl.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 (Somalia timeline)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978 (Mali timeline)
Weizman, E and Sheikh, F (2015) The Conflict Shoreline: Colonisation as Climate Change in the Negev Desert, Göttingen: Steidl.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 (Somalia timeline)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978 (Mali timeline)
Holly, thanks for this interesting reference to the "aridity line". It would be interesting to know the source of the data for the aridity line as the current contours of the southern boundary across the Sudano-Sahel are most certainly incorrect. I recall Naomi Klein referring to this previously but had not noticed this error until seeing it in your post. For what it is worth, the drone strikes in your second map (red circles?) are in places with much greater than 200 mm of mean annual rainfall. I am not entirely dismissing the argument (the northern boundary looks much more reasonable) but wonder exactly what is being argued here. As you know, the most water-stressed countries in Africa (North Africa) have the highest rates of access to safe water.
ReplyDeleteHi Richard,
DeleteThanks for noticing this!! - I was unsure of the validity of Weizman's case overall (which I was trying to unpack in both this post and the second on the scarcity-casues-violence paradigm) so understanding more specific problems is very helpful.
I am hoping to write a future post on misleading narratives in mainstream literature and the media in relation to water in Africa so I will almost definitely mention the issue there!
Thanks again.